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Windsor, Shelby County, and the Demise of Originalism:
A Personal Account
DAWN JOHNSEN*
By the final day of the Supreme Court’s 2012–2013 Term, when the Court
issued decisions in challenges to two laws that discriminated against same-sex
marriages,1 a remarkable consensus anticipated essentially the outcomes
announced. Court watchers expected that Justice-in-the-middle Anthony Kennedy
would lead the Court cautiously toward protecting against sexual orientation
discrimination and, in any event, would not set back the cause of marriage equality
by upholding either law. Although a substantial and passionate minority of the U.S.
population continued to oppose the ability of gays and lesbians to marry, by June 6,
2013, the issue’s eventual resolution seemed quite clear and few believed that the
Court would put itself on the “wrong side” of that history.2
A closely divided Court in United States v. Windsor met these expectations by
declaring unconstitutional the section of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that
limited marriage for federal law purposes to a man and woman.3 A different fiveJustice majority in Hollingsworth v. Perry declined to reach the constitutionality of
similar discrimination in a state law, California’s Proposition 8, by finding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.4 The two decisions, in effect, ended more than one
thousand forms of federal discrimination against married same-sex couples5 and, by
allowing the Perry district court ruling to stand, made California the thirteenth
state, plus the District of Columbia, to permit same-sex couples to marry. More
than thirty-eight percent of the U.S. population now lives in jurisdictions where

† Copyright © 2014 Dawn Johnsen.
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I
am grateful for comments on drafts of this Essay from Jeannine Bell, Bill Marshall, and Jeff
Powell. I also want to thank my colleagues Daniel Conkle, Steve Sanders, Ryan Scott, and
Deborah Widiss for suggestions and insights shared throughout the process of preparing our
panel and our essays, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer for helpful discussions about Shelby County, the
American Constitution Society for sponsoring the panel that led to this symposium issue, and
Indiana Law Journal Editor-in-Chief Richard Culbert and Executive Articles Editor Chris
Fyall for their outstanding work.
1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
2. In 2013, for the first time a slight majority of Americans supported the legality of
same-sex marriage. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supports and Opponents See Legal
Recognition as ‘Inevitable’, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 6,
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/in-gay-marriage-debate-both-supporters-and
-opponents-see-legal-recognition-as-inevitable/ [hereinafter PEW POLL] (finding 51% support
and 42% opposition); Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in
U.S., GALLUP POLITICS (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage
-support-solidifies-above.aspx [hereinafter GALLUP POLL] (finding 53% support and 45%
opposition).
3. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
4. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
5. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
(2004).
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women and men may marry or have their out-of-state marriages recognized
regardless of sexual orientation—and after Windsor, receive federal as well as state
benefits associated with marriage.6
The Court’s invalidation of DOMA, and the very fact that the outcome was
widely anticipated, marked an extraordinary evolution in constitutional law, as
interpreted by the Court and understood by the American people. Windsor’s
discussion of the merits began by emphasizing the rapid and recent changes in how
states and the public have approached the issue.7 When Congress enacted DOMA
in 1996, every state limited marriage to a man and a woman and many Americans
had not seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise.
Justice Antonin Scalia alluded to that change, with the intent of discrediting its
legitimate role in constitutional interpretation, during the March 2013 oral
arguments when he pressed marriage-equality advocate Theodore Olson to answer
the question: “When did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples
from marriage?”8 This question foreshadowed the two principal grounds on which
Windsor is constitutionally significant: first, for what it said about the substantive
constitutional protections that apply to sexual orientation discrimination, and
second, for the interpretive methodology the Court used to reach its conclusions.
Windsor’s four opinions—one for the five-Justice majority and three for the four
dissenting Justices—disagreed about precisely what the Court concluded, which
may caution restraint in speculating about the case’s future import.9 This Essay
hazards the prediction that 2013 will be regarded as a momentous year in the
history of two distinct legal/political movements that first gained momentum in the
1980s: most obviously, strengthening the movement to combat sexual orientation
discrimination and repression; and, more generally and less noted, weakening the
movement to promote “originalism” in constitutional interpretation and American
politics.
Paradoxically, in breaking new ground and interpreting the Fifth Amendment
expansively to reflect the American people’s changed understandings, the Windsor
Court adhered to a traditional interpretive approach and implicitly rejected efforts,
begun in earnest during the Reagan Administration, to substitute a form of
originalism that would yield radically different interpretations across a great range
of issues. Behind Justice Scalia’s question at oral argument was a form of
originalism, for which he has emerged as the best-known advocate, that seeks to
interpret the Constitution with reference only to the text and the original meaning
of the text at the time of the provision’s adoption, understood at a very specific
level of meaning. In holding that DOMA violated “basic due process and equal
protection principles,” the Court instead relied heavily upon “the community’s . . .
evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.”10 Windsor thus reflects not
only constitutional change in the direction of more expansive judicial protection of

6. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (figure as of
December 15, 2013, the date this Essay went to press).
7. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144).
9. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (Kennedy, J.), 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),
2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
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equal protection and due process, but also fidelity to a mainstream approach to
interpreting the Constitution that considers a range of sources and methods and
allows for the consideration of evolving social norms and constitutional
understandings.
The exchange between Justice Scalia and Mr. Olson (who it is worth noting had
served as a high-ranking official in the Reagan and George W. Bush
administrations) conveys the essential difference in the competing approaches:
JUSTICE SCALIA: [W]hen did it become unconstitutional to exclude
homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted? . . .
MR. OLSON: When—may I answer this in the form of a rhetorical
question? When did it become unconstitutional to prohibit interracial
marriages? When did it become unconstitutional to assign children to
separate schools[?]
JUSTICE SCALIA: It's an easy question, I think, for that one. At—at
the time that the Equal Protection Clause was adopted. . . .
...
MR. OLSON: There’s no specific date in time. This is an evolutionary
cycle.11
The Court of course had not yet ruled on the constitutionality of state
discrimination and as of the writing of this Essay, still has not. Indeed, it was so
determined to avoid the issue in Perry that it may have reached the wrong
conclusion on standing. In Windsor, the Court held DOMA unconstitutional on
grounds tied to its particular facts: DOMA’s “purpose and effect to disparage and
to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”12 Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent makes a strong case,
however, that a holding that it is “unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples
from marriage” is just a matter of time, and perhaps not much time.13
In this Essay, I accept Justice Scalia’s invitation to focus on dates and consider
how his question might best be answered with reference to relevant dates in the
United States’ constitutional history. This frame helps explain my expectation and
my hope that the Court’s decisions of 2013 will prove vital for the future of not
only the substantive constitutional protections against marriage discrimination but
also how the Court and “We the People” interpret the Constitution across a range of
issues—and that those decisions will hasten the end of a narrow form of
originalism that would be devastating to both “the liberty of the individual” and
“the demands of organized society.”14 Beyond Windsor, I would point to the
Court’s decision issued a day earlier in Shelby County holding unconstitutional a
core provision of the Federal Voting Rights Act. Justice Scalia joined a bare five-

11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144).
12. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
13. Id. at 2709–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Justice majority opinion despite its plain inconsistency with his professed
originalist approach—to the detriment of racial equality and democracy.15
Countless articles and books, of course, have been written about each of the dates
and issues I briefly address. My observations will by necessity be selective and will
include a few of a personal nature, based on my legal work over the last quarter
century as well as by virtue of simply having lived through a time of remarkable
social and legal change.16
An important initial note about terminology: a political and legal movement
during the 1980s adopted the label “originalism” in opposition to what it
characterized as “activist,” pro-rights, anti-federalism rulings of the Warren and the
Burger Courts. How best to use the term today, however, is sharply and
interestingly contested among those who endorse a more mainstream interpretive
approach: some are content to cede the term while others seek to redefine it and
talk in terms of “originalisms,” plural, including to emphasize that they too care
about original meaning. For example, Professor Jack Balkin has called for “living
originalism,”17 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has asserted, “I count myself as an
originalist too,”18 and then-Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan has declared, “we
are all originalists.”19 Diversity exists, too, on the ideological right, seen, for
example, in self-described originalist defenses of Brown v. Board of Education20
and the Court’s extension of constitutional protections against sex discrimination.21
Justice Scalia has described himself as a “faint-hearted originalist”22 and “an
originalist and a textualist, not a nut,”23 and he in fact at times has acknowledged

15. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
16. Before joining the faculty at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law in 1998, I
served as law clerk to Richard D. Cudahy on the U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit (1986–87), staff counsel fellow at the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project (1987–
88), legal director of NARAL Pro-Choice America (1988–93), and deputy assistant attorney
general (1993–96) and acting assistant attorney general (1997–98) for the Office of Legal
Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice.
17. Compare JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011), with DAVID A. STRAUSS,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
18. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Ginsburg Speaks About Gender Equality, ABCNEWS
(Nov. 18, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/justice-ginsburg
-speaks-about-gender-equality/.
19. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. See e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011).
22. “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the
punishment of flogging.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 864 (1989). In a 2013 interview, Justice Scalia repudiated that statement. Jennifer
Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 7, 2013, at 1, available at
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
23. Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (April 28,
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the legitimacy of other interpretive sources such as precedent and the varying
consequences of competing interpretations. Among the Justices, it is Justice
Clarence Thomas who comes closest to principled adherence to a narrow form of
originalism.24
Although I appreciate the desire among moderates and progressives not to cede
the term, as well as the diversity of originalisms on the right, I feel it equally vital to
recognize that, to the extent we are all originalists, we also all are living
constitutionalists.25 This Essay principally addresses the popularly recognized 1980s
form of originalism represented most prominently among the Justices by Justice
Scalia, in academia by Robert Bork, and in politics and government by President
Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese.26 That narrow and rigid originalism, which
achieved its apex in 1986 with Bowers v. Hardwick’s upholding of a Georgia
criminal ban on sodomy,27 is utterly irreconcilable with Windsor and Shelby County.
Those June 2013 decisions, I believe, may signal originalism’s demise.
1791 and 1868: Adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
A constitutional provision’s meaning at the time of its adoption is a
longstanding component of mainstream constitutional analysis. Justice Scalia’s
exchange with Mr. Olson, however, insists upon the year of adoption as a complete
response, and the only legitimate one to his question. Hence his suggestion of the
years of adoption of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments: 1791 and 1868.
Seeking thus to limit constitutional meaning to text and specific meaning at the
time of ratification is the hallmark of the modern originalism movement.
For an originalist, analysis of the constitutionality of DOMA or any
discriminatory federal law is complicated by the fact that the Fifth Amendment, the
source of relevant constraints on Congress, does not include an Equal Protection
Clause (unlike the state-constraining Fourteenth Amendment). Both contain Due
Process clauses.28 Justice Scalia asked his question in Perry where the California
law was at issue, so he appropriately referenced 1868 and “when the Equal
Protection Clause was adopted” in response to Mr. Olson’s rhetorical questions
2008, 7:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017.
24. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Justice Scalia
“acquiesced” in “substantive due process” doctrine to invalidate state gun control measures).
Many have noted the differences between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 7, 7 (2006) (“This leaves Justice Thomas as the only justice who seems at all bound
by originalist conclusions with which he may disagree.”).
25. See Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1151, 1178–81 (2013) (reviewing SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMEIL, JUSTICE BRENNAN:
LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 69–85 (1986–87: Bowers and Bork). To
underscore the complexity of using the term, even Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, and Edwin
Meese differed somewhat in their approaches to originalism.
27. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V; “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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about racial segregation and bans on interracial marriage. For DOMA, however, the
directly relevant text is the 1791 Due Process Clause.
It does not take a constitutional historian to appreciate that the specific original
meanings of due process/liberty and equal protection in both 1791 and 1868 do not
support constitutional protection against sexual orientation discrimination in
marriage laws, state or federal. In Windsor, the Court flatly rejected Justice Scalia’s
originalism and went decidedly with Mr. Olson’s “evolutionary” approach.
Whether characterized as “living constitutionalism,”29 “living originalism,”30 or
simply constitutional interpretation, the roots of Windsor in this respect can be
traced to another early year, 1819, when the Court issued a decision widely viewed
as foundational, McCulloch v. Maryland.31 Chief Justice John Marshall there
described the Constitution as “intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”32 The Court in
McCulloch was interpreting the scope of congressional powers, but its reasoning
for a flexible, evolving approach properly informs constitutional interpretation
more generally:
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all
future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely,
the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.33
In another often-quoted passage, the Court further admonished, “[W]e must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”34 McCulloch remains a
canonical decision, the foundation of the Court’s interpretive approach, which
Justice Breyer has characterized as including “traditional legal tools, such as text,
history, tradition, precedent, and purposes and related consequences.”35
1954: Brown
The central role Justice Anthony Kennedy would play on matters of sexual
orientation discrimination became apparent at least a decade before Windsor when

29. See STRAUSS, supra note 17.
30. See BALKIN, supra note 17.
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
32. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
35. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 74 (2010); see
also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY
AND POLITICS 205, 208 (2002) (Our nation’s “shared constitutional first principles” include:
“In constitutional argument it is legitimate to invoke text, constitutional structure, original
meaning, original intent, judicial precedent and doctrine, political-branch practice and
doctrine, settled expectations, the ethos of American constitutionalism, the traditions of our
law and our people, and the consequences of differing interpretations of the Constitution.”)
(emphasis omitted).
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his 2003 opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas directed attention to the year
1954, and the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education,36 as a
critical point in evolving constitutional understandings.37 One of originalism’s
greatest challenges has been the difficulty in squaring a court-ordered end to racial
segregation of public schools with the specific meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment at its 1868 adoption, when Northern as well as Southern states
maintained racially segregated schools and Congress itself segregated the schools
in the District of Columbia.38 Mr. Olson’s rhetorical question—“When did it
become unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools?”—evokes the fact
that the Framers clearly did not intend that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause would prohibit racial segregation. That understanding came in
1954 with Brown’s rejection of a narrow, rigid originalism: “[W]e cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
[Plessy] was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”39
Arguably even more difficult on originalist grounds was Brown’s companion
case Bolling v. Sharpe,40 which held that the segregation of the District of
Columbia schools was inconsistent with the “liberty” protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—adopted in 1791, a time when enslaving
persons of African American descent was widely regarded as consistent with this
guarantee of “liberty.” The Court acknowledged that the absence of an Equal
Protection Clause made the issue “somewhat different,” but disposed of the case in
six short paragraphs.41 The Bolling Court found that “the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are
not mutually exclusive.”42 The Court merged consideration of the two concepts as
well as the standards of review that are familiar today, to the end that due process
protects against at least some forms of discrimination that, when committed by
states, are approached as a matter of equal protection. The Court cited what we
today call strict scrutiny reserved for suspect classifications and fundamental
liberties but then found that segregation was “not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective,”43 the familiar standard of rational basis review. The Court
offered little else on the precise effect the Fourteenth Amendment has on
interpreting its predecessor amendment, except to note: “In view of our decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated

36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance . . . .”).
38. See 2 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 801–04 (1st ed. 1975).
39. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93; see also id. at 489 (finding the evidence of intent
“inconclusive”).
40. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 499.
43. Id. at 499–500 (“Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental
objective.”).
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public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”44 Bolling would become a key precedent
for Windsor’s treatment of the discrimination claim brought under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.45
1965/1967: Griswold and Loving
When Mr. Olson raised the closest precedent for marriage equality for gays and
lesbians with his rhetorical response to Justice Scalia—“When did it become
unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriages?”—he knew well that the Court
did not end state criminalization of interracial marriage until the startlingly late date
of 1967, in Loving v. Virginia.46 Even in the 1960s, the issue was a live one:
counsel for Mildred and Richard Loving explained at oral argument that sixteen
states banned interracial marriage, recently down from seventeen following
Maryland’s repeal and failed repeal efforts in Oklahoma and Missouri.47 Of interest
with regard to the issue of the timing of the Court’s resolution of controversial
constitutional questions, the Loving Court stressed it had never before addressed
the issue,48 even though it had dodged a challenge to that very Virginia statute a
decade earlier when the Virginia Supreme Court upheld it.49 Moreover, as the
Loving Court noted, in 1883 it had faced a closely related question and upheld
Alabama’s conviction and two-year sentence of an interracial couple for living
together while unmarried.50
The State of Virginia’s defense centered on arguing that the statute punished
whites and African Americans equally and thus did not discriminate on the basis of
race, and, relatedly, that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend
to prohibit such a use of race.51 Mildred and Richard Loving both had been
sentenced to a year in prison for marrying a person of a different race. The Court
unanimously held that the ban plainly used race for the purpose of promoting
“White Supremacy” in violation of equal protection of the laws.52 The Court held

44. Id. at 500.
45. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“[DOMA] violates
basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. See
U.S. CONST., Amdt. 5; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 . . . (1954).”).
46. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. Transcript of Oral Argument, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 12-144), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395.
48. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (“This case presents a constitutional question never
addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to
prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
49. See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80 (1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), remanded to,
197 Va. 734 (1956), motion to recall denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
50. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)). Alabama was
the last state in the nation to have on its books a criminal ban on interracial marriage.
Alabama Considers Lifting Interracial Marriage Ban, CNN.COM (Mar. 12, 1999, 1:32 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/12/interracial.marriage/.
51. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–8.
52. Id.
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further that the law deprived the Lovings of liberty in violation of due process by
denying them “the freedom to marry,” and cited for support Skinner v. Oklahoma, a
1942 case recognizing constitutional protection against forcible sterilization.53
Government prohibitions on same-sex marriage and sexual intimacy similarly
are challenged today on both equal protection and liberty/due process grounds. But
given the pervasive past discrimination against homosexuality and the unsettled
status of even interracial marriage in the mid-1960s, there was no chance the Court
would have recognized those parallels at that time and protected “the freedom to
marry” someone of the same sex. Among the overwhelming historical evidence are
statements to the effect that homosexuality is not constitutionally protected in
various opinions in the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut, which upheld the
constitutional right of married couples to use contraception, and a 1961 dissent in
Poe v. Ullman in which Justice Harlan dissented from the Court’s dismissal of a
challenge to the same Connecticut ban on contraception.54 In all, five of the seven
Justices in the Griswold majority joined opinions that distinguished the state’s
authority to ban homosexuality or illicit relationships.
Justice Harlan’s Griswold concurrence has withstood the test of time and,
together with his Poe dissent (which he incorporated by reference), describes stillfollowed standards for interpreting the “liberty” protected substantively by the
guarantee of due process.55 Although Justice Harlan distinguished rights associated
with homosexuality, his interpretive approach plainly left open the possibility that a
future Court could reach a different conclusion. Citing McCulloch, he wrote of the
importance of “approaching the text . . . not in a literalistic way, as if we had a tax
statute before us, but as the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare but

53. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very
existence and survival.”). The Court also wrote of the two protections together. Compare
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process.”), with Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes,
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due
process of law.”).
54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(specifically referencing homosexuality, Justice Goldberg quoted Justice Harlan’s Poe
dissent, stating: “It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy.”); id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (stating that state
policies against “promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships” are a “legitimate legislative
goal”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The right of
privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that adultery,
homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately
practiced.”).
55. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining his reasoning by
reference to the “reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman”); see
also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992) (citing Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Poe and subsequent concurrence in Griswold).
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meaningful terms the principles of government.”56 Constitutional interpretation
must strike a balance between “the liberty of the individual” and “the demands of
organized society” and have “regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing.”57 Loving and Griswold thus are central to understanding the process
by which discrimination against same-sex marriage has come to be understood as
unconstitutional, in terms of the substantive protections of equal protection and
liberty and the connections between the two, the appropriate interpretive
methodology and role of original meaning, and the Court’s practice of delaying
resolution of controversial issues until it decides the time is right.
1973: Roe and Frontiero
Justice Scalia is correct that the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, construed narrowly consistent with his approach to originalism, did
not encompass protection against sex discrimination or governmental control of
personal decisions about sexuality and childbearing.58 In 1873, the pervasive
unequal treatment of women included a Court decision upholding an Illinois law
that excluded women from the practice of law, with Justice Bradley now
infamously concurring to declare that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”59 As
recently as 1961, the Court cited women’s special role as mothers to uphold a state
exclusion of women from mandatory jury service.60
In the early 1970s the Court began to protect women from laws that limited their
opportunities to what in 1868 commonly was viewed as women’s “natural” role. In
1973 Justice William Brennan’s landmark plurality for four Justices in Frontiero v.
Richardson made the case that sex discrimination should trigger heightened judicial
scrutiny. Four additional Justices found that the federal law, which gave men
higher presumed benefits on the assumption they typically are heads of households,

56. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat) 316 (1819)).
57. Id. at 542.
58. See Nina Totenberg, Interviewing Scalia: Verbal Wrestling Match with a Master,
NPR (July 25, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/25
/157384080/interviewing-scalia-verbal-wrestling-match-with-a-master; see also Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007).
59. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873). This is a useful point to
remind of the diversities of originalism. It was in response to a law professor’s originalist
argument that women were not protected under the Equal Protection Clause that Justice
Ginsburg, a chief advocate in the 1970s for constitutional protection against sex
discrimination, declared: “I have a different originalist view. I count myself as an originalist
too, but in a quite different way from the professor.” de Vogue, supra note 18.
60. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (“[A] woman is still regarded as the center
of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a
State . . . to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special
responsibilities.”).
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did not survive even mere rational basis review.61 That same year, a seven-Justice
majority held that the right to liberty substantively protected the right of women to
be free from governmental interference with the decision whether to terminate a
pregnancy, such that abortion restrictions would trigger strict judicial scrutiny.62
These protections for women would prove significant for the equality and liberty
of gays and lesbians, but the Court and the country certainly were not ready to
make those connections at the time. In 1972 the Court dismissed, on what was
supposed to be a mandatory appeal, a constitutional challenge to a Minnesota
statute that limited marriage to heterosexual couples; Justice Scalia referenced the
case in his rhetorical questioning of Mr. Olson, suggesting as a possible date,
“some time after Baker, where we said it didn’t even raise a substantial Federal
question?”63 Nor was the Court ready to recognize restrictions on women’s
reproductive liberty as a form of sex discrimination.64 Later criticism of the Roe
Court for being inadequately sensitive to that connection tends to lack adequate
grounding in historical reality, just as does criticism that Roe actually set back
reproductive rights by getting too far ahead of public opinion.65 Indeed, throughout
the 1970s, many equality advocates argued against the possible connections
between discrimination on the basis of sex, on the one hand, and restrictions on
abortion or homosexuality, on the other, due to fear of harming efforts to ratify the
Equal Rights Amendment, which opponents argued would legalize homosexuality
and protect access to abortion.66
Even forty years later, sex discrimination challenges to abortion or sexual
orientation restrictions, although to my mind theoretically strong, generally have not
prevailed. In my experience working in reproductive rights advocacy, the terms of
political and legal advocacy are greatly affected by public opinion, even as advocates
struggle to undo popular prejudices. In 1973 (and even today), “women’s rights” and
“women’s liberty” were far less popular concepts than the “right to privacy” or
leaving the abortion decision to women in consultation with their physicians,
husbands, and clergy—as opposed to giving that private decision to politicians.
Justices increasingly have noted the equality implications of abortion restrictions, but
the Court still has not directly made the doctrinal connection to equal protection.67

61. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691–92 (1973); see also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny as the
form of heightened scrutiny appropriate for sex discrimination).
62. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12144) (discussing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
64. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (describing discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy as not sex discrimination, but discrimination between pregnant and nonpregnant persons).
65. Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, involved restrictions short of criminal bans
and thus makes this even less plausible. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See Linda Greenhouse & Reva
B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J.
2028 (2011).
66. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
67. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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Most recently, in 2007, Justice Ginsburg’s four-Justice dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart
chastised the five-Justice majority for using reasoning in upholding abortion
restrictions that “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and
under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”68
1986–87: Bowers and Bork
Many readers may have personal markers from which to consider Justice
Scalia’s intriguing question and the social and constitutional change of the last
quarter century. I graduated from law school in 1986, the year the Court held by a
five-to-four vote in Bowers v. Hardwick that the Constitution did not protect
against laws that made it a crime for consenting adults of the same sex to be
physically intimate in the privacy of their own homes.69 A few months later, Justice
Scalia joined the Court (with a confirmation vote of ninety-eight to zero) to succeed
William Rehnquist, who was appointed Chief Justice. The next year brought the
retirement of Justice Lewis Powell, a necessary fifth vote in Bowers as well as in
cases affirming Roe v. Wade and protecting against sex discrimination.70 President
Reagan nominated Robert Bork of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
These events will be familiar to many. My attention was particularly keen because
I was completing a one-year fellowship at the American Civil Liberties Union and
most seriously considering two jobs: legal director of a reproductive rights
organization at a time Roe seemed in jeopardy, and staff attorney at the ACLU’s
then-fledgling LGBT project when combatting criminal sodomy laws and
employment and AIDS-related discrimination topped the agenda (and certainly not
marriage equality). I vividly recall that, of the two, LGBT issues seemed far more
controversial and difficult to foresee success. Roe, although in immediate jeopardy in
the Court, enjoyed strong and consistent support among the American public. In the
years since, the legal and political standing of the two sets of issues, which are closely
aligned in many doctrinal and theoretical respects, have dramatically flipped in ways
very few would have predicted.71 My personal response to “when did it become
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage” is that the evolution
has been astounding since I was admitted to the bar, twenty-six years ago, and events
around the time of my bar admission were central to that progress.
The Bowers Court upheld the application to “consensual homosexual sodomy”
(declining to address heterosexual sodomy) of a Georgia law that imposed criminal
penalties of one to twenty years of imprisonment for engaging in oral or anal sex.72
Michael Hardwick was arrested for having consensual oral sex in his own bedroom
with a man. In a remarkably short opinion that relied heavily on specific original
meaning, the Court cited all of the sodomy bans on the books of all thirteen states

68. 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Thornburgh, 476
U.S. 747.
71. My decision was made easy when Nan Hunter, then-director of the ACLU LGBT
project, offered the excellent advice that I should take the legal director position—and did
not offer me the other.
72. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
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when they ratified the Bill of Rights and the bans in place in all but five of the thenthirty-seven states at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.73 The
Court went beyond narrow originalism concerns and also noted that twenty-four
states continued to ban private consensual sodomy in 1986.74 Beyond that, the
Court said little and was remarkably dismissive of what it called a “facetious”
claim.75 It declared that none of the liberties it previously had found within the
fundamental right to privacy “bears any resemblance” to Hardwick’s claim and that
“[i]t is obvious to us” that a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in
consensual sodomy is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”76 Justice Powell, who later
expressed regret for casting a decisive fifth vote, authored a concurrence that
signaled ambivalence by suggesting that the law might violate the Eighth
Amendment, an argument not presented to the Court.77
When in 1987 President Reagan nominated Judge Bork to succeed Justice
Powell, Bork was originalism’s intellectual leader. He also had authored an
influential opinion, which Bowers cited, that held against a claim of sexual
orientation discrimination.78 Attorney General Edwin Meese, appointed in 1985,
became originalism’s chief public advocate, leading the Reagan administration’s
pursuit of extensive constitutional change: in favor of an approach to federalism
that would enhance state sovereignty and diminish congressional power and in
opposition to the pro-rights “activism” of the Warren Court and continued under
Justice William Brennan’s leadership. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the Court’s
leader in this regard. Meese’s principal contribution was to make Judge Bork’s
form of originalism the centerpiece of that agenda, even where it actually did not fit
(as in affirmative action and congressional authority), through public advocacy,
lengthy Department of Justice reports, government litigation, and judicial
appointments.79 To give just one example, a Department of Justice report directing
government litigators to feature originalism selected Bowers as a model of
originalism and listed as “inconsistent” with originalism and thus illegitimate
(among many others): Skinner v. Oklahoma’s protection against forced
sterilization, Griswold v. Connecticut’s protection of the right of a married couple
to use contraception, Loving v. Virginia’s recognition of a right to marry, and Roe
v. Wade’s protection of the right to decide whether to have an abortion.80 The report

73. Id. at 192–93 & nn.5–7.
74. Id. at 193–94.
75. Id. at 194.
76. Id. at 190, 192, 194.
77. See id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash,
Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, at A1 (quoting Justice
Powell as saying that he “probably made a mistake in [Bowers]”).
78. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. For extensive discussion (with citations) of the leadership provided to the 1980s
originalism movement by Judge Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Attorney General
Meese, see Johnsen, supra note 25, at 1167–81; Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the
Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional
Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 385–406 (2003).
80. O FFICE OF LEGAL P OLICY, U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON
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described the protection of women from discrimination under heightened judicial
scrutiny as “tenuous at best” and the recognition of any additional classes protected
under equal protection analysis as illegitimate.81
The Reagan Administration relied heavily upon Judge Bork’s writings.82 The
Senate refused to confirm Judge Bork, on a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two, largely
for the views expressed in those same writings, prominent among them a 1971
article in the Indiana Law Journal.83 All of the issues discussed to this point in this
chronology were the subject of the Senate’s intense questioning of Judge Bork in
confirmation hearings that gripped the nation, particularly his views against
Griswold and constitutional protection for a right of privacy.84 President Reagan
ultimately nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Anthony Kennedy to Justice
Powell’s seat, an event that would prove of great consequence for the direction of
the Court. In 2008, long-time New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse, reflecting on a thirty-year illustrious career covering the Court,
astutely captured the core difference between Robert Bork and Anthony Kennedy:
“Judge Bork’s constitutional vision, anchored in the past, was tested and found
wanting, in contrast to the later declaration by Judge Anthony M. Kennedy, the
successful nominee, that the Constitution’s framers had ‘made a covenant with the
future.’”85
1992: Casey
Noteworthy among the many consequential cases in which Robert Bork likely
would have voted differently than Justice Kennedy is the 1992 decision Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.86 The events of this period
remain vivid to me: at the time I served as the legal director of a reproductive rights
organization that had just helped lead opposition to the nomination of Clarence
Thomas to replace retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall, in part because it seemed
virtually certain he would provide the fifth vote to overrule Roe.87 In Casey, Justice
Thomas voted as expected and joined Justice Scalia and Roe’s two original
dissenters, William Rehnquist and Byron White.88 But Justice Kennedy’s vote
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 78–83 (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (listing by issue
examples of Supreme Court opinions the Reagan Administration believed were “consistent”
with originalism and those that were wrongly decided).
81. Id. at 78.
82. See, e.g., id. at 3.
83. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
84. See generally M ARK GITENSTEIN, M ATTERS OF P RINCIPLE: AN INSIDER ’ S
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S R EJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE S UPREME
COURT (1992).
85. Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK1.
86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
87. Cf. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Justice Kennedy joined
a four-Justice plurality that applied only rational basis review to uphold abortion
restrictions). The nomination ended in Thomas’s confirmation by a vote of fifty-two to fortyeight, the narrowest margin in the Supreme Court’s history. 102 CONG. REC. 26354 (1991)
(Senate confirmation of Justice Thomas).
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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surprised all sides: he coauthored an extraordinary “joint” opinion with Justices
Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter that was joined by a total of five Justices
in parts that reaffirmed “Roe’s essential holding.”89
The five Justices in the Casey majority parted ways on some particulars vital to
women’s reproductive liberty,90 but they found remarkable agreement on the issues
most directly relevant to Justice Scalia’s question about the timing of protections
related to sexual orientation. The Casey joint opinion relied heavily on Justice
Harlan’s Poe/Griswold approach to fundamental rights—which the Court in
Bowers had ignored entirely.91 It reaffirmed application of that approach to the
right to use contraception not only for married couples, but also, as the Court had
subsequently held, for unmarried individuals and minors, stating “[w]e have no
doubt as to the correctness of those decisions.”92 The Court also forcefully rejected
Justice Scalia’s narrow originalist approach as “inconsistent with our law.”93
The Casey Court further emphasized the importance of constitutional change in
its extended discussion of stare decisis. In discussing Brown’s overruling of Plessy,
the Court emphasized the constitutional relevance of society’s evolving
understanding of facts: “Society’s understanding of the facts upon which a
constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally different from the
basis claimed for the decision in 1896.”94 The Court declared that “Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided” but explained, in language Windsor would echo,
why the Court could not appreciate that at the time: “[Brown is] comprehensible as
the Court’s response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations
disclosed, had not been able to perceive.”95
1996: DOMA and Romer
When Congress passed DOMA in 1996 by overwhelming margins and President
Bill Clinton signed it into law, I was a deputy assistant attorney general in the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which advises the
President on constitutional and other legal (as opposed to policy) questions. I recall
significant time spent during my five years at OLC on several legal issues related to
sexual orientation, in part driven by President Clinton’s strong opposition to sexual
orientation discrimination, including the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, legislation to protect against hate crimes
committed because of the victim’s sexual orientation, legislation that required the
dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 843, 846.
90. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in fact charged that the joint opinion “retains the
outer shell of Roe v. Wade, but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of the case.” Id.
at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
91. Id. at 847–50.
92. Id. at 852.
93. Id. at 847 (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.”).
94. Id. at 863.
95. Id.
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military to discharge HIV-positive individuals, and the provision of the Colorado
Constitution at issue in Romer v. Evans.96 These issues raised complex legal
questions, but DOMA did not.
Then-head of OLC (and my direct boss) Walter Dellinger recently noted that the
Department of Justice’s statement at the time was “carefully worded to avoid
opining that the Justice Department itself believed DOMA was constitutional”97
and instead stated: “The Department of Justice believes that the Defense of
Marriage Act would be sustained as constitutional if challenged in court . . . .”98
This statement clearly was an accurate assessment at the time. The Court would not
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick for another six years, and if a state could send a gay
couple to prison for up to twenty years for their relationship, the federal
government certainly did not have to afford the benefits associated with marriage to
the couple—particularly at a time no state allowed same-sex couples to marry.
Even among those who thought DOMA terrible policy and Bowers wrongly
decided, few could have imagined that in seventeen years the Court would strike it
down or that most Americans would oppose it.99
In 1996 Gallup for the first time polled the American public on the question of
same-sex marriage: 27% favored legal recognition of same-sex marriages and 68%
stated opposition.100 That same year, the Court decided Romer v. Evans on
relatively narrow equal protection grounds that would prove important precedent
for Windsor. The Court held that a Colorado constitutional provision that
prohibited local governments from enacting measures to protect against sexual
orientation discrimination failed even rational basis review.101
2003: Lawrence
By 2003 public opinion had begun to change, with 32% supportive of
recognition of same-sex marriage and 59% opposed,102 and that year the LGBT

96. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see The Clinton-Gore Administration: A Record of Progress
for Gay and Lesbian Americans, WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/Accomplishments/ac399.html (archival version of the Clinton
Administration White House website).
97. Walter Dellinger, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review, S LATE (June 23, 2013,
10:28 PM) (emphasis in original), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the
_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/doma_and_the_voting_rights_act_the
_supreme_court_can_strike_down_one_and.html.
98. The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1996) (letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen.).
99. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Current Conditions, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013, 6:57
PM) http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/current-conditions/?_r=0 (“When
Congress enacted DOMA . . . it was hardly thinkable that the Supreme Court . . . would
strike the statute down less than two decades later.”).
100. GALLUP POLL, supra note 2.
101. The Colorado provision, enacted by statewide initiative, prohibited measures to
protect “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”
Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
102. Gallup did not ask the question in 2003, but Pew obtained this result to a similar
question. PEW POLL, supra note 2.
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movement achieved a tremendous victory with the Court’s overruling of Bowers.
Professor Jack Balkin posted the following hypothetical response to Justice Scalia’s
question, under the title “Supreme Court Arguments We’d Like to See”:
JUSTICE SCALIA: You—you've led me right into a question I was
going to ask. . . . I'm curious, when -when did—when did it become
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791?
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted? . . .
MR. OLSON: Well, according to your
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court decided that issue in 2003.103
Lawrence’s five-to-four overruling of Bowers and invalidation of consensual
sodomy prohibitions—with an additional vote from Justice O’Connor for the
outcome, on more limited grounds—dramatically changed DOMA’s prospects.104
In striking down criminal prohibitions on consensual sodomy under a due
process analysis, Justice Kennedy wrote eloquently about the harms such laws
inflict on dignity, liberty, and equality. More generally, and of enormous
consequence for marriage equality, the Court strongly rejected Justice Scalia’s
originalism as an appropriate methodology and relied instead on the approach of
the Casey joint opinion:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.105
The Court, however, expressly reserved the issue of marriage, writing that the
case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”106 Justice Scalia
responded: “Do not believe it.”107 Accusing the Court of deception, he wrote, “[t]he
Court today pretends . . . that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual
marriage . . . .”108 Justice Scalia interpreted the Court’s opinion as definitely (and
wrongly) deciding the issue: “This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual
marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do
with the decisions of this Court.”109

103. Jack Balkin, Supreme Court Arguments We’d Like to See, BALKINIZATION (Mar.
26, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/03/supreme-court-arguments-wed-like
-to-see.html.
104. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Id. at 578–79.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 605.
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2013: Windsor and Shelby County
As of the writing of this Essay in 2013, the Court still has not held that it is
“unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage.” Windsor reached
only the federal government’s discrimination against marriages that states have
chosen to recognize. The federal government’s deviation from its traditional
recognition of state marriages raised suspicions, confirmed by the Court, of a lack
of legitimate purpose. In a dissent that strongly echoed his Lawrence dissent,
Justice Scalia accused the Court of intentionally “fooling . . . readers” about the
import of its decision.110 He ridiculed the Court for “jaw-dropping” and “rootless
and shifting”111 reasoning, and “legalistic argle-bargle”112 that he speculated the
Court had designed “to support its pretense” that it left “the second, state-law shoe
to be dropped later,”113 which he predicted “will of a certitude”114 happen. An
imagined response along Professor Balkin’s lines thus now might add: “And,
Justice Scalia, according to your Windsor dissent, the Court eliminated any
remaining doubt in 2013.”
To conclude this chronology, I consider 2013’s significance both in
strengthening the marriage equality movement (along the lines Justice Scalia
predicts but deplores) and in diminishing the 1980s originalism movement (perhaps
something Justice Scalia fears, which may help explain the bitter tone of his
Lawrence and Windsor dissents). Regarding future marriage equality claims, the
four dissenters were not all with Justice Scalia: all expressed strong views that
DOMA is constitutional, but contrary to Justice Scalia (joined only by Justice
Thomas in the merits discussion), Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
emphasized the limited nature of the Court’s holding and the influence of
federalism concerns that would not be present in a state law challenge.115 Their
analysis seems designed to encourage litigants and lower courts (and perhaps a
future changed Court) to distinguish Windsor, while Justice Scalia’s dissent surely
will be cited in support of challenges to state discrimination.116
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are technically correct about the limited
and restrained nature of Windsor’s holding, but Justice Scalia seems accurate in
forecasting how the current Court would vote. A portion of his dissent cleverly
quoted the Court’s opinion at length, omitting words that limited the reasoning to

110. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2698, 2705.
112. Id. at 2709.
113. Id. at 2705.
114. Id. at 2710.
115. See id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting), 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia nonetheless encouraged lower
courts to “take the Court at its word and distinguish away.” Id. at 2709. The day of the
decision, Professor Laurence Tribe provided an insightful analysis of the contradictions and
“troublesome cynicism” in Justice Scalia’s dissent and the “delicate blend of principle and
politics” behind the Supreme Court’s decision. Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and Justice
Scalia’s Intemperate Dissent, SCOTUS BLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-and-justice-scalias-intemperate-dissent/.
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the federal context.117 He opined that the ease with which the passages are
transposable is deliberate, intended to facilitate that last step toward full marriage
equality.118 Justice Scalia further charged the Court with, in effect, calling DOMA’s
supporters “monsters,” “enemies of the human race,” “enem[ies] of human
decency,” and people with “hateful hearts.”119
The Court does not come close to meriting such charges, nor is anything
underhanded about ruling modestly about only the federal law at issue. A broader
ruling that reached the appropriate standard of review for sexual orientation
discrimination would have provided clearer direction, but the Court instead
unsurprisingly applied the enhanced form of rational basis review from Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer, as well as the early sex discrimination cases, where the
Court saw reason for suspicion and “careful consideration” including of the actual
purpose behind the discrimination.120 The Windsor majority took great care to
explain the process of evolution in Americans’ views on marriage, for example,
describing “the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight.”121 The point is not
that DOMA’s purpose reveals bad people who are enemies of human decency, but
that people of good will and thoughtful consideration can evolve in their
understandings of human dignity and equality—as we as a nation have in our
understanding of why Plessy was wrong and why it was illegitimate (though
understandable) for the government to privilege men based on a presumption they
are the family breadwinners. Someone who once failed to recognize women’s
“pedestal” as a cage is no “monster” with a “hateful heart”—but today we do
recognize the cage.122
Barring a change in the composition of the Court by the replacement of one of
the five in the Windsor majority—and I would predict even then—the Court almost
certainly will hold it “unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from
marriage” and likely soon. Closely related, I predict that 2013 will accelerate the
demise of the 1980s school of originalism. The Windsor majority adheres to and
strengthens traditional interpretive methods that allow doctrinal evolution in
response to social changes, as revealed in Lawrence, Casey, Griswold, Loving, and
Brown. Indeed, those earlier cases may suggest that Scalia/Bork/Meese originalism
was all but dead even before Windsor; the now-discredited 1986 Bowers opinion
stands as its modern high-water mark.
Focusing on the decline of 1980s originalism as a legal doctrine, however,
would miss its significance as a political movement and organizing device that

117. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2710.
119. Id. at 2707–11.
120. The Court twice quoted Romer’s call for “careful consideration” of “discriminations
of an unusual character.” Id. at 2692–93 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
121. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
122. For example, even as Justice Brennan wrote his landmark Frontiero plurality
opinion, he initially refused to hire female law clerks and expressed the view he would not
be able to serve on the Court if a woman ever were appointed. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684 (1973); STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 25, at 386–77.

22

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:3

continues today, especially within the Republican Party, as evidenced in judicial
confirmation hearings and the Tea Party movement.123 It is in combatting 1980s
originalism as an organizing and rhetorical device used to delegitimize progressive
constitutionalism that 2013 may prove particularly consequential. The ultimate
achievement of marriage equality throughout the nation now appears a matter of
time, in large part because younger Americans are by far the most supportive.
Indeed, 72% of Americans, and 59% of even those opposed to allowing same-sex
marriage, describe an end to marriage discrimination as “inevitable.”124 And
marriage equality as a constitutional matter is simply irreconcilable with any rigidly
narrow form of originalism, perhaps even more inescapably than was the case with
Brown, Loving, Frontiero, Griswold, and Roe, both as a methodological matter and,
as important, in ways apparent to an American public that has lived through and
increasingly embraces constitutional change at dramatic odds with the Framers’
original expectations and narrow original meanings.125 As more and more
Americans see the same-sex marriages of their family, friends, and neighbors
treated under the law with equal dignity, as Walter Dellinger has observed, “at
work” will be “the enormous effect” of what Professor Charles Black, writing of
race, described as the “normative power of the actual.”126
The year 2013 may also prove significant in the demise of 1980s originalism
because of a decision the Court issued the day before Windsor and Perry. At the
same time Justice Kennedy led the Court to advance equality for gays and lesbians,
he joined the dissenting Justices in Windsor to form a majority to invalidate a core
provision of the federal Voting Rights Act, to the detriment of racial equality in
political participation.127 A thorough discussion of Shelby County is beyond the
scope of this Essay, but worthy of note, in addition to the strikingly different
outcomes for race and sexual orientation, is the fact Justices Scalia and Thomas
abandoned originalism and joined an opinion that focused instead on the changed
conditions for racial minorities in the years since Congress first passed the Act.128
The Court concluded that the improved political standing of racial minorities meant
that Congress’s intrusions on state sovereignty no longer were justified—
notwithstanding that the section of the Fifteenth Amendment at issue by its plain
and original meaning conferred on Congress the authority both to intrude upon
state sovereignty to protect equality in voting and, equally fundamental, to make
any necessary judgments about what current conditions require. Justice Ginsburg’s

123. From the outset and increasingly over time, originalism has proven far more
powerful as political matter. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 F ORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546, 554 (2006)
(“Since the 1980s, originalism has primarily served as an ideology that inspires political
mobilization and engagement.”).
124. PEW POLL, supra note 2.
125. Professor Bill Marshall has powerfully demonstrated the utter failure of rigid
originalism to explain several landmark cases. William P. Marshall, Progressive
Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating
Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251 (2011).
126. Dellinger, supra note 97.
127. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
128. See id.
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dissent detailed the arguments from the constitutional text and original meaning, as
well as other considerations that dictated judicial deference to Congress.129 The
majority did not directly dispute that rational basis review was the appropriate
standard, but it in fact applied a heightened form of rational basis review and in the
end inappropriately substituted its judgment for that of Congress.130
Shelby County, of course, is far from the first time Justice Scalia has abandoned
originalism. His concurrence in Adarand similarly held unconstitutional a federal
provision designed to benefit racial minorities.131 Although both opinions deviated
from the originalism generally promoted by the Reagan/Meese agenda, they both
fulfilled objectives endorsed in that agenda—specifically, the expansion of state
sovereignty, the diminishment of congressional authority to enact legislation to
protect the rights of racial minorities, and an end to affirmative action.132
The failure of originalism’s principal adherents on the Court to employ it in
Shelby County should undermine any future efforts to limit the constitutional
guarantees of liberty and equal protection to the specific meanings, understandings,
and prejudices of 1791 and 1868. Those specific meanings and prejudices, as 1980s
originalism would have reflected them, plainly would have precluded the
meaningful constitutional protections the Court has afforded the equal dignity and
liberty of women and gays and lesbians, back at least half a century to Griswold’s
recognition of married women’s right to use contraception to avoid and control the
timing of motherhood. With Windsor and Shelby County, June 2013 marks what
should prove to be a decisive rejection of narrow originalism and a reaffirmation of
our nation’s longstanding constitutional commitment to respecting evolving social
understandings of what constitutes equal protection and liberty for those we once
marginalized and stereotyped through the force of law. Conversations about
originalisms, plural, and the ways in which we all may be originalists and living
constitutionalists will endure, as they should. Notwithstanding continued major
disagreements on a host of particulars, we seem finally to have progressed beyond
the originalism of Bowers v. Hardwick, in favor of a lasting embrace of a
remarkably successful, adaptable, and inclusive Constitution, in Chief Justice
Marshall’s words, “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”133

129. Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). One “success” of 1980s originalism may be
the heightened attention of judges, scholars, and advocates to originalism, including in an
effort to hold Justices Scalia and Thomas accountable.
130. See id. (majority opinion).
131. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). Linda Greenhouse
thoughtfully and cogently analyzed the role “current conditions” played in the Court’s
decisions in Shelby County, Fisher, and Windsor. See Greenhouse, supra note 82.
132. See Johnsen, supra note 79, at 389–92 (discussing GUIDELINES, supra note 77); see
also OFFICE OF LEGAL P OLICY, U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, R EDEFINING D ISCRIMINATION:
DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1987).
133. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted).
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Conclusion
I conclude this Essay with another chronology, this one of a personal nature.
The day after the Court decided Windsor, my sister Jennifer Johnsen celebrated her
fourth wedding anniversary, and she posted the following on her Facebook page to
explain the legal trajectory of her relationship with my sister-in-law Dawn
Guarriello134:
We have more anniversaries than most couples, which I know is
confusing! Here’s the breakdown for those of you who asked:
9/6/86

— started dating

8/10/96 — commitment ceremony (we thought there was a
good chance we’d never be able to get married)
6/27/09 — state marriage (in CT because NY wouldn’t
perform them but recognized out-of-state samesex marriages)
9/6/09

— NY wedding with family and friends (we recycled
our original anniversary)

And now finally on 6/26/13 we have a legally fully recognized
marriage135
As I read this post, I was struck of course by the injustice and personal cost, and
also by the connections between the personal and the legal. Jennifer and Dawn have
been together for twenty-seven years, since 1986, coincidentally the year the Court
held in Bowers that they could constitutionally be imprisoned for their relationship.
Ten years later, they despaired of ever being able to marry and held a small,
necessarily unofficial commitment ceremony in my parents’ backyard. That was
1996, the year Congress enacted DOMA. They married four years ago, in 2009,
when their home state of New York refused to perform their marriage but would
recognize an out-of-state marriage. In 2011, New York became the eighth state to
end marriage discrimination. In 2013, the Court held DOMA unconstitutional and
their relationship finally is afforded equal legal status.

134. I thank Jennifer and Dawn for allowing me to share their story, and I dedicate this
Essay to them and to the memory of my father, Donald Johnsen. My father’s willingness to
work seemingly endless hours at second and third jobs enabled his four children to attain
educational and life advantages he did not enjoy. His loving heart, open mind, and deep
patriotism all helped drive his ever-evolving views on race, gender, and sexual orientation,
shared in countless patient conversations. His personal journey and efforts, echoed in similar
stories in so many American families, strengthen in me an enduring optimism for our
country’s continued progress toward our constitutional commitments to equality and justice.
135. Facebook Post by Jennifer Johnsen, FACEBOOK (June 27, 2013) (on file with the
author).
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As of 2013, almost sixty-two percent of Americans live in states that will not
allow individuals of the same sex to marry, including my state of Indiana, where
the legislature has passed a proposed amendment to write that discrimination into
the state constitution, as most states already have. Legislative action in 2014 will
determine whether the proposed amendment goes to the public in a ballot question.
“When did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexuals from marriage?”
The process toward “a more perfect union” continues.136

136. “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union . . . do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.

